

# **A** BOUT PAN-SCANDINAVIANISM. REFERENCE POINTS IN THE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY (1815-1864)\*

**Mircea-Cristian Ghenghea**

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University in Iași, E-mail: mcghenghea2010@yahoo.com

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## **Abstract:**

*At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> a sense of solidarity shared by the people of the Northern Europe appeared: Pan-Scandinavianism. First it had a certain impact at cultural and spiritual levels. In a narrower sense the term was used when referring to the possibility of creating a political union between the Nordic kingdoms during the middle decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.*

*Although it seemed that the political side of Pan-Scandinavianism had a good chance of accomplishing itself, especially after the Three Years War (1848-1851), the international context from the period that followed did not favour that plan. The collapse of the political Pan-Scandinavianism was in 1864 – the Second Schleswig-Holstein War. Sweden-Norway failed in helping Denmark against Prussia and Austria, despite the fact that King Karl XV was an advocate of Pan-Scandinavianism. Leaving this aspect aside, there were other internal difficulties of the Nordic states that Pan-Scandinavianism had to face, including the emerging nationalism. On a broader view, Pan-Scandinavianism appeared as an opponent of Panslavism and Pangermanism. Thus the dream of a unified Scandinavia was abandoned in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Pan-Scandinavianism focused on cultural, scientific and economic cooperation.*

## **Rezumat:**

*La sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea și la începutul celui de-al XIX-lea a apărut un sentiment de solidaritate împărtășit de locuitorii Europei nordice: panscandinavismul. Mai întâi a avut un anumit impact la nivel cultural și spiritual. Într-un sens mai restrâns, termenul a fost*

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\* A previous form of this text was published in Romanian several years ago – see Mircea-Cristian Ghenghea, ‘Repere ale panscandinavismului în veacul al XIX-lea (1815-1864)’, *Opțiuni istoriografice*, VIII<sub>1</sub> (2007), 117-135.

utilizat atunci când se făcea referire la posibilitatea creării unei uniuni politice între regatele nordice în deceniile de la jumătatea secolului al XIX-lea.

Deși se părea că latura politică a panscandinavismului avea o șansă de a se concretiza, mai ales după Războiul de trei ani (1848-1851), contextul internațional al perioadei care a urmat nu a favorizat acest plan. Colapsul panscandinavismului politic s-a produs în 1864 – al doilea război pentru ducatele Schleswig și Holstein. Suedia-norvegia nu a reușit să ajute Danemarca împotriva Prusiei și Austriei, în ciuda faptului că regele Karl al XV-lea era un susținător al panscandinavismului. Trecând peste aceste aspecte, au existat dificultăți interne al statelor nordice cărora panscandinavismul a trebuit să le facă față, inclusiv afirmarea naționalismului. Într-un plan mai larg, panscandinavismul a apărut ca un adversar al panslavismului și al pangermanismului. Astfel visul unei Scandinavii unificate a fost abandonat în secolul al XIX-lea, iar panscandinavismul s-a axat pe cooperarea culturală, științifică și economică.

**Keywords:** Pan-Scandinavianism, political unity, Schleswig-Holstein, nationalism, defensive formula.

One of the most interesting members of the “pan” family from modern times is, without doubt, the Pan-Scandinavianism. Its cultural, economic and historical reverberations and their significances for the Scandinavian societies are proved by quite an impressive bibliography<sup>1</sup>. Yet, its climax happened at mid-19<sup>th</sup> century,

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<sup>1</sup> Above all, the fundamental work belongs to Henrik Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske Drømme og politiske realiteter. Den politiske skandinavisme i Danmark 1830-1850* (Århus: Arusia – Historiske skrifter I, 1981), the author making a relevant and thorough analysis of the political ideal promoted by Pan-Scandinavianism at mid-19<sup>th</sup> century; overall approaches or references of substance related to the general issue or certain aspects of it can be found at: A. Geffroy, *Histoire des États scandinaves* (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1851); David Urquhart, *Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South by Opening the Sources of Opinion and Appropriating the Channels of Wealth and Power. Second Edition* (London: Trübner&Co., 1853); Henry de Valory, *Le scandinavisme pratique. Solution de la question des duchés. Memorandum politique* (Paris: Amyot, 1863); A.D. Jørgensen, *La question dano-allemande* (Copenhague: Imprimerie Græbe, 1900); R. Nisbet Bain, *Scandinavia. A political History of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 1513 to 1900* (Cambridge: University Press, 1905); Olof Höijer, *Le scandinavisme dans le passé et dans le présent* (Paris, Éditions Bossard, 1919); *America in the Forties. The Letters of Ole Munch Ræder*. Translated and edited by Gunnar J. Malmin (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1929); Lawrence D. Steefel, *The Schleswig-Holstein Question* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1932); J.H.S. Birch, *Denmark in History* (London, John Murray, 1938); Ludwig Krabbe, *Histoire de Danemark. Des origines jusqu'à 1945* (Copenhagen, Paris: Ejnar Munksgaard, C. Klincksieck, 1950); Pierre Jeannin, *Histoire des pays scandinaves* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965); A.S. Kan, *Geschichte der skandinavischen Länder (Dänemark, Norwegen, Schweden)* (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1978); T.K. Derry, *A History of Scandinavia. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1979); Åke Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)* (Göteborg, 1946); idem, 'On the Practicability of Scandinavianism: Mid-nineteenth-century Debate and Aspirations', in *Scandinavian Journal of History* 9:2-3 (1984): 171-182; Hans Kuhn, 'Romantic myths, student agitation and international politics: the Danish intellectuals and Slesvig-Holstein', *Scandinavica* XXVII, 1 (1988): 5-19; Emanuel Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864. A Chapter of Russian Policy towards the Scandinavian Countries*. Translated from Polish by Roger A. Clarke (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel's Forlag, 1990); *Nordic Paths to National Identity in the Nineteenth Century*. Edited by Øystein Sørensen (Oslo: The University of Oslo, 1994) (from here on *Nordic Paths to National Identity...*); Steen Bo

when its political expression became dominant. Having a retrospective look we might say that the specific realities from those times favoured the political side of Pan-Scandinavianism. Although the social adherence in Denmark and Sweden-Norway seemed to be more than promising, the fulfilment of the political aims was obstructed not only by opponents from outside Northern Europe, but also by certain factors specific to every Nordic country in particular.

### What is Pan-Scandinavianism?

From the moment of realizing the impact it had for the political sphere, Pan-Scandinavianism entered the attention of analysts, diplomats and political experts of the European Powers which were interested in the realities of the Baltic Sea. As an immediate consequence, they tried to define and to frame it within the specific parameters of the international relations from the 19th century. This way Pan-Scandinavianism ceased to be a privilege of students' circles, of university-men and men of letters from Denmark, Sweden and Norway, becoming a good of the European political and diplomatic patrimony.

From the mid-19th century until nowadays Pan-Scandinavianism got different characterizations and definitions. However, all these underline its appearance and its development in the specific Scandinavian intellectual environment from the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century by appealing to a common cultural, historical and mental inheritance. In 1857, in a period when the political expression of Pan-Scandinavianism seemed to have a chance for its accomplishment, A. Geffroy was characterizing it as a "feeling of common fraternity", which had been founded on "memories and identical interests"<sup>2</sup>. After almost a century, in 1938, J.H.S. Birch considered that Pan-Scandinavianism was "a natural born sentiment springing from the recognition of a common parentage"<sup>3</sup>. *The New Cambridge Modern History* connected this aspect with the general background of nationalism - a "wider northern nationalism", showing that "although the Romantic movement had made Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes more conscious of their differences, a number of intellectuals had emphasized the broad similarities of history, tradition, and culture, and suggested

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Frandsen, *Dänemark – der kleine Nachbar im Norden. Aspekte der deutsch-dänischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994); idem, *Opdagelsen af Jylland. Den regionale dimension i Danmarkshistorien 1814-64* (Århus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 1996); *Geschichte Schleswigs vom frühen Mittelalter bis 1920*. Redaktion: Henrik-Becker Christensen und Ulrich Lange (Aaberna: Institut for Grænseregionsforskning, 1998); etc.

<sup>2</sup> A. Geffroy, 'Le Scandinavisme et le Danemark dans la crise actuelle', *Revue des deux mondes* XXVII<sup>e</sup> année - seconde période, tome neuvième (mai-juin 1857): 5: "On appell *scandinavisme* ce sentiment de la fraternité commune né, il y a une trentaine d'années à peine, chez les trois peuples du nord scandinave, fondé sur des souvenirs et des interest identiques, et qui, s'étant peu à peu transformé en idée précise et en dessein pratique, a desormais une histoire".

<sup>3</sup> Birch, 328.

that closer intellectual interchanges and political friendship would enable the North to play a greater part in Europe"<sup>4</sup>. In his turn, Louis L. Snyder offered a general definition for all pan-movements or macro-nationalisms – these “may be regarded as extended nationalisms on political scene. They paint nationalism on a much broader canvas to include all (*pan*) those who by reason of geography, race, religion, or language, or by a combination of any or all of them, are included in the same group category”<sup>5</sup>. *Encyclopedia of Nationalisms* from 2001 defines Pan-Scandinavianism as referring “to a belief in a common Scandinavian cultural heritage based on the medieval literature of sagas and Eddic poetry and a belief in «common society, common languages, common faith»”<sup>6</sup>.

We could continue with other definitions of Pan-Scandinavianism or we could simply admit, as Uffe Østergård did, that “the notion of Pan-Scandinavianism” (as a political expression) is one of the paradoxes of the Northern Europe’s history<sup>7</sup>; nevertheless, as we have already mentioned, they all conclude that Pan-Scandinavianism began as a cultural and spiritual movement which tried to emphasize the common historical background of the Nordic countries – Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The Northern past was revealed by intellectuals in order to prove the cultural affinities and to promote a closer cooperation.

Yet, what is Pan-Scandinavianism? Should we just generalize and place it in the category of macro-nationalisms as Louis Snyder did<sup>8</sup>? Or should we keep the idea of cultural emergence and development with a later political expression? Whenever we try to offer a definition for an intellectual construction we usually omit to underline in a proper manner at least one of these three elements: the sender, the receiver and the means to be used by the sender to get to the receiver. After all, Pan-Scandinavianism, just like Romanticism, Nationalism, Communism, etc. represents an intellectual and mental creation. Having in mind this trinitary scheme and the definitions that we already mentioned we could define Pan-Scandinavianism as a mental and intellectual construction, elaborated and promoted by Danish and Swedish intellectual and university circles, in order to strengthen the conscience of the common origin of the Nordic peoples. Its immediate and practical utility was to be seen in the '40s and '60s from the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the political formula of Pan-Scandinavianism dominated. The

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<sup>4</sup> *The New Cambridge Modern History, X – The Zenith of European Power 1830-70*. Edited by J.P.T. Bury (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), 220.

<sup>5</sup> Louis L. Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms. A History of the Pan-Movements* (Westport-London: Greenwood Press, 1984), 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Encyclopedia of Nationalism, II – Leaders, Movements and Concepts*. Editor-in-chief Alexander J. Motyl (San Diego-San Francisco-New York-Boston-London-Sydney-Tokyo: Academic Press, 2001), 400.

<sup>7</sup> Uffe Østergård, “The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation-States”, <http://kultuffe.dk/nordic-identity-between-norden-and-europe>, accessed in August 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Snyder, 4-5, 111-113.

failure of applying the political precepts of the movement was caused not only by very strong external obstacles but also by various internal aspects.

### **The Roots of Pan-Scandinavianism**

The Kalmar Union (1397-1523) was the period of official political unity of the Nordic countries. The union functioned in practice up to 1521, when Gustav Vasa became king of Sweden. From 1523 onward the Nordic region was divided. After the disappearance of the Kalmar Union, Denmark and Sweden were enemies for almost three centuries, trying to achieve the dominance of Scandinavia. This attitude became to change after the end of the Great Nordic War in 1720-1721, which brought an end to Sweden's period as a major power. Both Denmark and Sweden began to understand the threat represented by Russia in the Baltic area.

By the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century there were opinions about the possibility of recreating the lost unity. Despite this, the relations between Denmark and Sweden were again tensed at the end of the reign of Gustav III (1771-1792)<sup>9</sup>.

However, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century there were gestures, statements and attitudes that proved the existence of a Nordic, Scandinavian consciousness, even from a political point of view. At the same time, it cannot be ignored the fact that there was a medieval political legacy which represented a reminder of the realities of the late 14<sup>th</sup> century (the current historiographic language extended the use of the term of Pan-Scandinavianism also for those realities specific to medieval times<sup>10</sup>). Yet, everything remained at this intentional and declamatory level, in a restrictive circle - intellectual and diplomatic. Not even the reign of the Swedish king Gustav III (married to the Danish princess Sofia Magdalena) could bring modifications regarding this issue, although the king's intentions for a Scandinavian union were well known.

Nevertheless, in the last decade of the 18<sup>th</sup> century one can register the multiplication of the initiatives and declarations of a certain impact for the general background of the cultural, political, and diplomatic Scandinavian realities. One of the most significant moments in this regard was the conclusion of the Treaty of neutrality between Denmark and Sweden in 1794, when the Danish foreign minister Bernsdorff said that "everything that brings Denmark and Sweden closer to each other is natural; all that separates them is unjust and unnatural"<sup>11</sup>. It was also noticed a growing interest in cultural and scientific

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<sup>9</sup> Ion Hurdubețiu, *Istoria Suediei* (Bucharest: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1985), 189.

<sup>10</sup> Silviu Miloiu, *O istorie a Europei Nordice și Baltice*, I - *De la epoca naționalismului la Războiul Rece* (Târgoviște: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2004), 98.

<sup>11</sup> "The Royal Skandinavism", <http://www.oresundstid.dk/kap/baggrund.aspx?id=8&forsideid=664,663>, accessed in August 2014; Nisbet Bain, 383-384: "The one bright side of this gloomy and sordid period was the rapprochement between the Scandinavian kingdoms during the revolutionary wars. Thus on March 27, 1794, a neutrality compact was formed between Denmark

exchanges between Denmark and Sweden, reaching a true spiritual emulation which had a certain relevance for the broad framework of Pan-Scandinavianism. The foundation, in 1796, of the “Scandinavian literary society”, which also published a periodical of its own (“Scandinavian Museum”), is a proof of this aspect. Writers and scholars became preoccupied with revealing the Nordic mythology, the literature and the history of the Scandinavian middle age. At the same time, the close links between the Nordic languages were scientifically demonstrated by the Danish linguist Rasmus Rask<sup>12</sup>.

At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the European background was dominated by the Napoleonic wars which the Scandinavian states were also drawn into. Tensed moments and a series of “national and political disasters”<sup>13</sup> (1801, 1807, 1809, 1814) have resulted in an increasing interest for a Pan-Scandinavian formula which seemed to be able not only to offer a recovery of the former greatness, but also to become a viable political alternative for the 19<sup>th</sup> century’s realities. Names like N.F.S. Grundtvig<sup>14</sup>, Adam Oehlenschläger, J.J.A. Worsaae, Rasmus Rask, Esaias Tegnér, S.S. Blicher, Orla Lehmann, Carl Ploug, Oscar Stuzenbecker, H.C. Ørsted, Hans Christian Andersen, etc. can be found in this process of reconsidering the Nordic traditions, the Vikings’ cult and promoting the ideas referring to the necessity of accomplishing a common development path for the Nordic countries. Through their work and accomplishments, they contributed not only to the revitalization of a glorious past which was supposed to serve as an example to their contemporaries, but also to the appearance of a somehow messianic nationalism<sup>15</sup>, an exaltation of the Scandinavian virtues with a certain impact on the public consciousness<sup>16</sup>. In the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, due to a certain background of profound changes within the European continent under the influence of the “religion of freedom”<sup>17</sup>, the so-called “national romanticism” put its mark on both the Scandinavian nationalisms and Pan-

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and Sweden; and their united squadrons patrolled the North Sea to protect their merchantmen from the British cruisers. This approximation between the two governments was happily followed by friendly feelings between the two nations; under the pressure of a common danger, the consciousness of the kinship of the two Scandinavian peoples awoke for the first time on both sides of the Sound, and their secular national hatred began to yield to sentiments of amity and fraternity”.

<sup>12</sup> “The Literary Scandinavism”, <http://www.oresundstid.dk/kap/baggrund.aspx?id=8&forsideid=665,663>, accessed in August 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Østergård.

<sup>14</sup> P.G. Lindhardt, *Grundtvig. An Introduction* (London: S.P.C.K., 1951), *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> For the whole of this interesting issue of the messianic nationalism see the work of J.L. Talmon, *Political Messianism. The Romantic Phase* (London: Secker&Warburg, 1960), *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> Lindhardt, 62-63, 94-99.

<sup>17</sup> Benedetto Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. Translated from Italian by Henry Furst (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1934), 3-19.

Scandinavianism<sup>18</sup>. One of the consequences was the transformation of cultural nationalism in political nationalism<sup>19</sup>, a matter with a particular relevance for the North of the continent.

### **The Red Thread of Political Pan-Scandinavianism – the Schleswig-Holstein Question (1815-1864)**

For the 19<sup>th</sup> century Pan-Scandinavianism the political frame was intended to be that of the concrete fulfilments, of accomplishing the ideas and aspirations for a strong and vigorous North, able to successfully oppose the dominating tendencies of the Great European Powers. The Napoleonic wars and the continental order established by the Vienna Congress directly affected the situation of the Scandinavian states which, after 1815, recorded a negative balance of their involvement in the events. Finland and Åland Islands had become parts of the Russian Empire since 1809. In 1813, attacked by the Swedish armies, Denmark was forced to cede Norway, which effectively became a part of the neighbouring state in 1814. One should add to these matters the damages suffered during the wars and the loss of human lives – the episode of Copenhagen's bombardment in 1807 left deep traces in the Danish collective mental.

Despite all these events which, at least for a while, favoured the reappearance in the foreground of the Danish-Swedish adversity, during the Napoleonic wars there were certain plans and ideas of accomplishing, one way or another, a Scandinavian state structure. Thus, in 1810, following the death of the heir of the Swedish throne – the Danish prince Christian August – Frederik IV, the king of Denmark, intended to restore the Kalmar Union and to become king of the three Scandinavian kingdoms<sup>20</sup>.

However, the real test for Pan-Scandinavianism in general and for its political side in particular was foreshadowed after 1815 – the question of the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. The duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg were in the possession of the Danish kingdom, Lauenburg being given to Denmark as a sort of compensation for the loss of Norway in favour of Sweden. The situation was complicated internationally by the decision to include the duchies Holstein and Lauenburg, former parts of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation, in the German Confederation, while Schleswig, in spite of the fact that it was inhabited by a significant German population, was not included<sup>21</sup>. Under these

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<sup>18</sup> B.J. Hovde, *The Scandinavian Countries, 1720-1865. The Rise of the Middle Classes*, II (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1948), 452-469.

<sup>19</sup> Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany. Its History and Civilization*. Second Edition. Chapter XXIII by Klaus Epstein (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), 23-25.

<sup>20</sup> Hurdubefiu, p. 206.

<sup>21</sup> Steefel, 4-5.

new conditions, the Danish monarchy desired both to impose and to maintain its authority over all the mastered territories, as well as the centralization of power. Nevertheless, in the context of liberalism's and nationalism's affirmation, the kings of Denmark had to confront problems they were not able to solve, the final result being, after a few decades, the territorial destruction of the monarchy. Liberalism and nationalism equally influenced the Danish and German elites; almost unavoidably, one of the consequences was the triggering, in the '30s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, of the disputes related to the possession of the previous mentioned duchies<sup>22</sup>. At the same time, this was the period in which the political side of Pan-Scandinavianism, directly connected to this dispute, began to come into prominence.

Essentially, the conflict triggered between Danes and Germans had as stake the mastering of the duchy of Schleswig, the only one of those three in which Denmark had direct interests and was not a part of the German Confederation<sup>23</sup>. The confrontation, though, had also another stake – the clear and open affirmation of the Pan-Scandinavianism's purposes in opposition to those of the German nationalism and, on a larger scale, of Pan-Germanism<sup>24</sup>. It was completely right to show that “the origin of the political Scandinavism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century must be sought in the Copenhagen government's desires to ensure the territorial integrity of Jutland”<sup>25</sup>. The intentions of maintaining the territorial frame which was established in 1815 for the Danish monarchy had become obvious even after the French revolution in 1830, an event which had a certain influence on the institutional climate and on the political atmosphere in Northern Europe<sup>26</sup>. For Denmark, the issue of constitutional changes automatically involved the effort of dealing with the German claims<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>23</sup> *European Diplomatic History 1815-1864. Documents and Interpretations*. Edited, with Original Translations, Chapter Introductions and Scholarly Notes by Herman N. Weill (New York: Exposition Press, 1972), 149.

<sup>24</sup> The idea regarding the necessity of finding Denmark and Sweden within a common framework of action can be traced to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century as a way of facing more easily the dominating tendencies of the neighbouring powers – see Höijer, 15-16. Also at p. 19: “C'est sous la pression des revendications violentes et enflammées de la race teutonique et des panslavistes que réapparut dans le Nord l'idée d'une union scandinave”.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>26</sup> Derry, 221: “In Scandinavia as elsewhere, a change of atmosphere and some modification of institutions followed the French Revolution of July 1830”.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 222: “On Denmark the effect of the July Revolution in France was more direct and at the same time more complex, since a constitutional change, which was obviously overdue, involved a confrontation with German separatist claims. Thus before the close of the year 1830 Holstein was one of the number of members of the German Confederation where the setting up of Estates was being demanded on the basis of the Vienna settlement; and a Holstein official (who was imprisoned for his pains) had even proposed a constitution on the Norwegian model for a united Slesvig-Holstein, to be linked with Denmark by the monarchy alone”.

While the matter which led to the two wars between Denmark and the German Confederation kept worsening, Pan-Scandinavianism evolved on and up, at least in the '30s and '40s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. From the initial spiritual and intellectual effervescence it got to the implementation of the Scandinavian ideal within the terms of the political and diplomatic relations specific to the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>28</sup>. The establishment of a Nordic union was viewed with sympathy especially by the Danish liberal-nationalists, who promoted the idea of a Scandinavian state which should have included the duchy of Schleswig. Moments like 23 June 1829 (when, during a ceremony that took place in Lund, the Swedish poet Esaias Tegnér and the Danish one Adam Oehlenschläger paid homage to each other, Tegnér crowning Oehlenschläger with a laurel wreath and reading a poem in which he showed that the time of division had past)<sup>29</sup>, 1843 and 1845 (when large gatherings of students took place in Uppsala and Copenhagen)<sup>30</sup> had a certain impact on the public consciousness, insinuating within the collective thinking the belief that the Scandinavian political ideal might know a close fulfilment. In 1839, thanks to the efforts of Frederik Barfod, the first issue of the periodical "Brage og idun" appeared; in spite of the fact that it did not have a long existence, it contributed to the diffusion of the Pan-Scandinavian ideal<sup>31</sup>.

On the other hand, the partisans of the duchies' and Pan-Germanism's cause also organized meetings and congresses (Frankfurt - 1846, Lübeck - 1847), where they exposed the German ideas and thesis related to the matter in question<sup>32</sup>. One of the most ardent defenders of the duchies' right of finding themselves within a German territorial frame was Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann who was regarded, after 1830, as a true symbol of the anti-Danish resistance in Schleswig.

The supporters of the necessity of the duchies' separation from the Danish Crown sustained that Schleswig and Holstein were in fact sovereign states, linked to Denmark only through a personal union; they were in union with each other, and the succession within the duchies followed the Salic Law, while in Denmark this one was broken. In their turn, the Danish liberal-nationalists, promoting the maintaining of the duchy of Schleswig within the kingdom<sup>33</sup>, were claiming that this one was rightfully a province of Denmark, being incorporated even in 1721; the union of the two duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, had no justification, neither

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<sup>28</sup> Höijer, p. 21: "Devant la menace du germanisme contre l'intégrité de ses domaines, le roi de Danemark crut habile de transplanter le scandinavisme du domaine littéraire des discours académiques sur le terrain plus dur et pratique des combinaisons politiques".

<sup>29</sup> This event is considered to mark the official birth of Pan-Scandinavianism - see for this Derry, 238-239; Jeannin, 80.

<sup>30</sup> Derry, 239.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Georges Weill, *L'Éveil des nationalités et le mouvement libéral (1815-1848)* (Paris: Alcan, 1930), 429.

<sup>33</sup> "Denmark to the Eider!" was their favourite slogan, Eider being the river which marked the border between the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.

historically nor legally. With regard to the succession in Schleswig, this was supposed to be the same as in the rest of the kingdom, where *Lex Regia* of 1665 allowed women to take the lead<sup>34</sup>.

The dispute between the two sides was moved to the battlefield on two occasions, in 1848 and in 1864. The deployment of the hostilities was presented and analyzed in numerous papers and studies<sup>35</sup>, whose authors highlighted the immediate or the future significances of the conflict in Northern Europe.

Leaving aside the specific interests of Denmark, Prussia, and the German Confederation, the conflict that broke out in 1848, also known as the Three Years War (1848-1851), revealed the attitudes of the other European powers directly interested in the political situation of the Baltic region – first of all England and Russia, then France and Austria. All the calculations and reasoning were better observed and understood in the context of the elaboration of the London Treaty, signed on 8 May 1852<sup>36</sup>.

It can be said that until the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-1856) Russia was a traditional ally of Denmark, a fact completely explainable in terms of its interests in the region<sup>37</sup>. That is precisely why the Jutland peninsula had to remain under the control of the Danish kingdom, a state which did not represent a political or military menace to the great power from the East<sup>38</sup>. Yet, Russia had another serious enough reason to intervene in the conflict between Denmark and Prussia – the fear that, if the Danes were defeated, they might consider a political union with Sweden (which had lost Finland in 1809 to Russia) or the replacing of the monarchic regime with a republican one<sup>39</sup>. During the '40s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Pan-Scandinavianism's adherence in Sweden had pretty much increased, and even king Oscar I (1844-1859) attended a students' meeting in Lund, in 1845, an occasion which he used for reciting the poem *Finland*, a clear allusion to the idea of recovering the territory annexed by Russia<sup>40</sup>. So, the reasons for Russia's involvement in settling the Prussian-Danish conflict in 1848-1851, although contrary to those of Sweden, had an identical purpose: support for Denmark.

Along with Russia, the British diplomacy was concerned about the possible disruption of the Baltic region's *status quo*. However, at the same time, it had to temper the Russian involvement in the unfolding events and to avoid the

<sup>34</sup> Steefel, p. 6.

<sup>35</sup> For a very small part of these see *supra* note 1.

<sup>36</sup> The text of the treaty at Halicz, 575-577.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 84-86.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 85: "Russia's foremost concern, evidently, was that Jutland should remain under the control of Denmark, a power that would not constitute a threat to Russian shipping, which was paramount to her national interests".

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 85-86.

<sup>40</sup> Østergård.

appearance of a new competitor at the Baltic Sea – Prussia<sup>41</sup>. In its turn, Austria could not remain impassive to an eventual increase of power and influence of Prussia in the north of the Germanic area. As for France, the traditional policy of this Great Power was to support Denmark and it was not interested in opposing to the British-Russian diplomatic cooperation<sup>42</sup>.

The way in which the events in 1848-1851 ended had an interesting impact on the Pan-Scandinavianism. Whereas, following the downturns and the Great Powers' pressures, the duchy of Schleswig remained in the possession of Denmark, the general impression within the Danish Kingdom was that the Danish military action, supported by Sweden-Norway<sup>43</sup>, was the one which imposed the end of the war<sup>44</sup>, Prussia being saved from the defeat only because of the intervention of the Great Powers. The consequence of the "spirit of '48"<sup>45</sup> was the reinforcement of opinions according to which Denmark and Sweden-Norway were able to face the German challenge; the reality was to be fully felt 13 years later, when the external situation favoured no more the Danish state.

The second war of the Schleswig-Holstein Duchies (1864) had a great importance not only for Denmark and the German Confederation, but also for the European context of the time. Quite a number of events in the seventh decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century tensioned the European politics and diplomacy<sup>46</sup>, and various opinions were expressed on several occasions with regard to the possible outbreak of a continental war which would engage all the Great Powers<sup>47</sup>. At the

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<sup>41</sup> Charles H. Pouthas, *Démocraties et capitalisme (1848-1860)* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1941), 76; Marshall Dill, Jr., *Germany. A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), 111; Gordon A. Craig, *Europe 1815-1914*. Second Edition (New York-Chicago-San Francisco-Toronto-London: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966), 165.

<sup>42</sup> Halicz, 86-89.

<sup>43</sup> T.K. Derry, *A History of Modern Norway 1814-1872* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 81: "On 11 May King Oscar signed a convention, which promised the support of 15,000 troops and a naval squadron within a month. [...] No Swedish or Norwegian sword was actually drawn in the conflict on the southern borders of Scandinavia. But during the summer of 1848 4,000 Swedes were stationed as a precaution in Fünen, a reserve force of Swedes and Norwegians was assembled in Scania, and the presence of a Swedish-Norwegian squadron emphasized Danish control of the sea".

<sup>44</sup> Karen Larsen, *A History of Norway* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1948), 424: "The protests of the powers caused Prussia to withdraw from the duchies, and this victory for Denmark was also looked upon as one for Scandinavianism".

<sup>45</sup> Vagn Wåhlin, 'The Growth of Bourgeois and Popular Movements in Denmark ca. 1830-1870', in *Scandinavian Journal of History* 5 (1980): 162: "To judge from letters written by soldiers and similar source-material, the spirit of '48 was a mass phenomenon for large sections of the population".

<sup>46</sup> Some of the most important issues that required the attention of the Great Powers' diplomatic cabinets were the Polish insurrection (1863-1864), the tensed situations in Greece and in the Italic Peninsula, the dense period of reforms within the United Principalities during Alexandru Ioan Cuza's reign (1859-1866), the Mexican adventure of Napoleon III, the Russian expansion in Central Asia, etc.

<sup>47</sup> Mircea-Cristian Ghenghea, 'Al doilea război al ducatelor Schleswig-Holstein (1864) reflectat în presa română a vremii', *Opțiuni istoriografice* VII<sub>2</sub> (2006): 123.

same time, together with other significant moments, the war in 1864 came to question the prestige of the Concert of Europe, whose end was already being foreseen by some politicians and diplomats<sup>48</sup>.

The events are generally known. Taking advantage of the favourable international situation and with an excellent occasion to discredit Austria, Otto von Bismarck knew how to speculate the situation created in Denmark and the duchies following the death of King Frederick VII, in 1863. On 18 November 1863, his successor, Christian IX (1863-1906), signed the liberal constitution which allowed the incorporation of the duchy of Schleswig into the unified Danish state (*Helstat*). The German Confederation reacted practically unanimously, declaring that the constitution violates the Treaty of London. Skilfully manoeuvring the context that appeared, Bismarck was able to replace the Federal Diet's initiatives by an action of Prussia and Austria<sup>49</sup>. He also secured the external background for such an operation. In the end, the military action began. During the campaign in early 1864 the Allied forces prevailed and Denmark had to cede in the matter of the duchies – the document that sealed this outcome was the Treaty in Vienna, signed in 30 October 1864<sup>50</sup>.

The second Schleswig-Holstein War is unanimously considered the end of the political Pan-Scandinavianism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century or at least of the idea that Denmark and Sweden-Norway could find themselves in a common frame of action, thanks to which they might harmonize their interests and unilaterally respond to all challenges that could arise<sup>51</sup>. Denmark fully accused the shock of the coup received in 1864<sup>52</sup>. In turn, during the reign of Carol XV (1859-1872),

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<sup>48</sup> David Thomson, *Europe since Napoleon*. Second Edition (London: Longman, 1979), 221-222. The American historian T.W. Riker offers a very plastic analysis for this aspect: "The Concert of Europe, this institution that was watching over the European peace, was like a wreck beaten by winds which had begun to take water. It had just been proved how helpless it was in face of the nationalism when strength and will supported this force; and as rightfully said an eminent historian, the war with Denmark, with its shameless disdain for a European solution «had completely broken the Concert of Europe»" – see T.W. Riker, *Cum s-a înfăptuit România. Studiul unei probleme internaționale 1856-1866*. Edition by Dan Jumară (Iași: Editura Alfa, 2000), 482.

<sup>49</sup> Jacques Droz, *Istoria Germaniei*. Second edition. Translation: Ecaterina Crețulescu. Preface and notes: Alin Ciupală (Bucharest: Editura Corint, 2006), 48.

<sup>50</sup> The text of the treaty at Halicz, 578-586.

<sup>51</sup> Ragnar Svanström, Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, *A Short History of Sweden*. Translated by Joan Bulman (London: Greenwood Press, 1975), 342: "Thus Pan-Scandinavianism as a political force received its death-blow in 1864"; Øystein Sørensen, "The Development of a Norwegian National Identity During the Nineteenth Century", in *Nordic Paths to National Identity...*, 33: "Scandinavianism was killed politically; the major blow was the failure of Sweden and Norway to support Denmark in the war against the German states, 1863-64"; Raymond E. Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden. Union, Disunion and Scandinavian Integration* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 49: "The failure of Norway-Sweden to aid the Danish cause in the war with Prussia in 1863-1864 killed political Scandinavianism".

<sup>52</sup> Derry, 1979, 248: "The loss of population, territory and economic resources was a crushing blow to the Danish monarchy, which had already forfeited the sovereignty of Skåne and more recently of

Sweden-Norway gave up any large-scale attempt in favour of the ideal regarding the Scandinavian political unity.

The consequences for the Danish society were numerous. On short term, the liberal-nationalists lost a great deal of the political capital that they had gained, placing themselves at the forefront of those who had sustained the necessity of a clear-cut attitude towards the issue of the duchies and finally the involvement in the war<sup>53</sup>. Therefore, internally, they were assigned the greatest blame for what had happened in 1864<sup>54</sup>. One can consider, however, that the defeat of 1864 also marked a victory for the Kingdom of Denmark from the perspective of the posterity. We are referring to the fact that the idea of shaping an essentially national Danish development framework came true, although in a less pleasant manner – the loss of a significant part of the state territory with the associated human resources and wealth. Unwittingly, Prussia (then Germany) assumed the role of a foreground enemy against the Danish national ideology, a fact which also had positive consequences in the process of setting and affirming the Danish nation after 1864. By the loss of the Schleswig duchy, Denmark “eliminated the national issue”<sup>55</sup>, a fact that led to fundamental changes in the future development of the Danish identity.

As for the broader plan of the realities which Pan-Scandinavianism had to confront with, it would be interesting to approach an aspect less frequently researched by specialists – the dispute against the two movements that supported the creation of very generous territorial boundaries in order to include all those who were members of the Germanic and Slav races – Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism<sup>56</sup>.

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Norway. Since what had been lost included some land of which the population was Scandinavian in language and loyalty, Scandinavia had shrunk *pro tanto*, whilst tentative hopes of its political unification had ended in a complete fiasco”.

<sup>53</sup> Gunner Lind, “Noblemen, Officers, and Democracy in Denmark. Values, Politics, and Interests 1660-1901”, in Bo Stråth (ed.), *Language and the Construction of Class Identities. The Struggle for Discursive Power in Social Organisation: Scandinavia and Germany after 1800* (Gothenburg: Department of History, Gothenburg University, 1990), 171: “The war of 1864 and its outcome demonstrated that the policy of the National Liberal Party had been based on illusions [...]”.

<sup>54</sup> Knud J.V. Jespersen, *A History of Denmark*. Translated by Ivan Hill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 65: “This marked the end of National Liberalism as its leaders had led Denmark into disaster”; Wåhlin, 164: “[...] the national liberals bore the political responsibility for Denmark’s catastrophic defeat in the war of 1864, which led to the loss of Schleswig and Holstein, that is to say about 40% of the kingdom’s most prosperous territories, to Prussia and Austria”; Palle Lauring, *A History of Denmark*. Translated from the Danish by David Hohnen (Copenhagen: Høst&Søn, 1995), 231: “The political outcome was that the party which had been in power up to now, the National Liberals, was obliged to accept responsibility both for the policy pursued and the resultant defeat”.

<sup>55</sup> Hovde, 554.

<sup>56</sup> For a general approach of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism and Pan-Scandinavianism see Snyder, 18 *sqq.*

Unlike the aggressive tendencies of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism, one might consider that Pan-Scandinavianism emerged as an intrinsically defensive cultural, above the state and ethnic groups formula<sup>57</sup>. Naturally, it affirmed by fighting the aggressive tendencies of the opponents, trying to settle a coherent frame for expressing and harmonizing the specific interests of all Nordic political entities. Nevertheless, the fundamental political coordinates of the two Nordic kingdoms, Denmark and Sweden-Norway, were essentially different, a fact noticeable within the events in the '40s – '60s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. But one of the most dangerous enemies of Pan-Scandinavianism was nationalism itself<sup>58</sup>.

Russia, which was steadily expanding its territory for whose justification used without any remorse the coordinates of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, threatened Sweden directly after having incorporated Finland. To the South, Denmark and the German Confederation had been engaged since the '30s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in a real war of the intellectuals, which would quickly propagate at the political level (with the known territorial outcomes). All these favoured the expression of the Danish, Swedish and German nationalisms, being converted at a larger scale into the conflict among Pan-Germanism, Pan-Scandinavianism, and Pan-Slavism.

The two trends – Pan-Scandinavianism and nationalism – did not mutually exclude themselves (especially during the period dominated by the wars for the Schleswig-Holstein duchies<sup>59</sup>), but they were certainly obstructing each other. The much broader, more comprehensive vision of Pan-Scandinavianism could not resonate with the specific goals of nationalism. They both related to the Nordic mythology and promoted historical and cultural values valid for the entire Scandinavian area; but while Pan-Scandinavianism was offering an integrative perspective of all these elements, nationalism was trying to seize the same values and to exclusively add them to the national heritage. Of course, there was the memory of a common past of the Nordic states, there was a heritage shared by all Scandinavian political entities. Yet the political Pan-Scandinavianism needed more to triumph against nationalism and the external opponents – there was no clear and unified vision regarding the prospect and the utility of Pan-Scandinavianism, an aspect highly influenced by the factors that were specific to each Nordic state.

The events in 1864 only led to the disappearance of the political side of Pan-Scandinavianism. The territorial losses and the external failures were overcome,

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<sup>57</sup> Höijer, 19: "C'est sous la pression des revendications violents et enflammées de la race teutonique et des panslavistes que réapparut dans le Nord l'idée d'une union scandinave".

<sup>58</sup> *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, 400.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*: "Sometimes, however, the interests of nationalism and Pan-Scandinavianism met: in their fear of German encroachments, Danish nationalists also became Scandinavianist [...]".

the Scandinavian cooperation initiated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century having outstanding prospected results. In the '40s – '60s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the political side prevailed (with the already revealed implications); later, after this political phase, Pan-Scandinavianism stated its goals more successfully on the cultural, scientific and economic levels.

## Conclusions

What did Pan-Scandinavianism miss in order to triumph as a political idea in the 19<sup>th</sup> century? Why was it impossible for its political expression to become reality considering the fact that the external dangers towards Denmark and Sweden-Norway were more than obvious? In our opinion, the answer is quite vast and involves several levels, which are to be mentioned randomly.

Pan-Scandinavianism did not impose politically because:

- this political formula, as thought and approached at mid-19<sup>th</sup> century could not meet the adhesion of all Scandinavians<sup>60</sup> – the most frequent idea, especially during the conflict in 1864, was that of realizing a union in which the leading role was to belong to Sweden and the Swedish royal family, a fact difficult to accept in Denmark; another reason was represented by the Swedish economic and military superiority, which led to an often reluctant and suspicious attitude from Denmark and Norway<sup>61</sup>.

- although one can speak about the existence of a certain programmatic, intentional, conceptual unity, this was not followed by concrete actions; in the critical moment, represented by the year 1864, the external conditionings directly influenced the attitude of Denmark and Sweden-Norway.

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<sup>60</sup> *America in the Forties. The Letters of Ole Munch Ræder, passim.*

<sup>61</sup> Höijer, 28: "Si dans les arts, dans la littérature, dans les utopies académiques de savants enthousiastes, la Scandinavie s'était enflammée pour l'unité de ses peuples, dans la politique réelle de tous les jours, il n'y avait eu que méfiances réciproques et oppositions irréductibles où chacun ne poursuivait que ses intérêts égoïstes et divergents. Au nom de la sainte égalité dans la trinité scandinave, on n'admettait pas la prééminence de la Suède dont la grande supériorité en ressources naturelles et militaires constituait pour les deux autres peuples frères une raison invariable de coalitions et d'ententes secrètes pour s'opposer aux vues de leur compagnon plus puissant. Les résultats étaient une simple neutralisation des énergies respectives des «peuples frères». Ainsi le bilan du scandinavisme poitique se soldait par la perte d'une province danoise et la séparation brutale des Suédois et Norvégiens". The author's conclusion is unequivocal: "le rêve scandinaviste était tombé en ruines au contact de la réalité"; at pp. 74-75 there is a general perspective of Pan-Scandinavianism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: "Pour apprécier à sa juste valeur la politique scandinaviste dans le passé et le présent, il importe d'appliquer le vieux principe diplomatique, de ne pas s'arrêter aux façons de parler, mais de s'arrêter aux façons de faire. L'expérience nous montre de façon concluante que tout ce qui mêle intimement la vie et les intérêts des trois peuples scandinaves signifie la fin de leur entente, car on se heurte à la barrière insurmontable de l'individualisme foncier des Scandinaves qui, tout en étant une des forces de leur nationalisme, est aussi une faiblesse chronique et irrémédiable de leur union sincère".

▪ no matter how generous and promising seemed to be the idea of Nordic unity at the time, the instinct of preserving the national entity against the broad political ideal represented by the Scandinavian entity eventually prevailed (we invoke here the same case of Sweden in 1864); the attempt to promote, at mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, a striking discourse in favour of Pan-Scandinavianism inevitably encountered the sensitivities that were specific to each Nordic country<sup>62</sup>. There were also reactions against this trend, especially in Finland and Norway which gained consistency and turned into the foundation of cultural societies and organizations which were seen in the field literature as reflexes of the Finnish and Norwegian nationalisms<sup>63</sup>.

▪ last but not least, the political Pan-Scandinavianism was regarded by Denmark and Sweden as an instrument to be used mainly for their own purposes, the Pan-Scandinavian ideal having to serve both to maintain the duchy of Schleswig within the Danish monarchy, and the recovery of Finland by Sweden<sup>64</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> *America in the Forties. The Letters of Ole Munch Ræder*, p. 220: "The prejudices in Norway and Sweden, both against each other and against the Danes, are stronger than the educated classes in both countries care to admit, and they form a rather effective barrier against further political union. The idea of a Scandinavian union has by no means penetrated the mass of the people, and there is no use arguing on general principles or external facts when you have to deal with sentiments. To be sure people in the North are bound to be influenced by the great drama that is being enacted in the rest of Europe, where states are being reduced to their elements as if by a chemical process and new states formed on the basis of the national instincts of the people themselves. Furthermore, the creation of a mighty nation in the center of Europe ought to impress us with the folly of remaining split into fragments, surrounded as we are, on the south, the east, and the west, by great powers. But is all this enough? Has the Pan-Scandinavian movement succeeded in reaching the hearts of the people themselves, the source of true devotion and enthusiasm? Has it made such a place for itself that it has become the object of their reflections by day and their dreams by night? Has it become so bound up with the very essentials of their existence that it has found its place in the Holy of Holies, along with their noblest and purest aspirations, their love for country, family, and home? This is rather doubtful, to say the least. The trouble so far has been that the Pan-Scandinavian movement has been an «idea,» not an instinct. People have not as yet felt themselves as one nation, and yet it is through national impulses that destiny lays down its laws for the future of states"; Jeannin, 84: "L'influence nettement plus faible du scandinavisme en Norvège tient à ce que celle-ci s'intéresse d'abord à ses aspirations nationales".

<sup>63</sup> Lindgren, 59: "To Norwegian radical and liberal leaders, Scandinavianism constituted not a single, but a twin danger. Johan Sverdrup, *Venstre* leader in Norway, said the «enemies of our independence and nationality live not in Germany and Russia but in Sweden and Denmark», and he organised a Norwegian society to protect Norwegian language and literature"; Eino Jutikkala, Kauko Pirinen, *A History of Finland*. Translated by Paul Sjöblom (Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1996), 321-322.

<sup>64</sup> Derry, 241; Østergård; Jutikkala, Pirinen, 320-321.

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