CHARLES BALLY AND PRAGMATICS

OSWALD DUCROT

I would like first of all to take advantage of this occasion to express, however inadequately, my gratitude to Charles Bally. It was Bally’s work, particularly the beginning of *Linguistique générale et linguistique française* [pt. 1, sect. 1] that led me to develop the linguistic theory of polyphony, which I have been working on for several years. To be sure, Bally, in certain respects, did not travel far enough along the path he opened up, but he did indicate a direction.

What I have just said should suggest in what way the title of my paper is more ambitious than its content. I do not intend to discuss all of Bally’s contributions to pragmatics, which include the theory of expressiveness, for example, which he developed in *Le langage et la vie*, or the several very important topics presented at the beginning of *Linguistique générale* having to do with the theory of enunciation. His theory of actualization (as opposed to characterization) in *Linguistique générale*, which reappears in several recent works on determiners,1 as well as a definition I have often used of the notions of subordination and coordination developed from the concepts of theme and topic [see "Les indéfinis et l’énonciation"] are both also worthy of note. I will not deal with any of these matters, however, but will focus on the “theory of the sentence,” from which my own polyphonic theory of meaning is directly derived. I will perhaps end up speaking less about Bally than about the musings for which his work has been my point of departure; but even that, I believe, is a way of paying him homage.

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My first point has to do with the notions of *modus* and *dictum*, which are at the very center of the theory of enunciation in *Linguistique générale*. Bally’s starting point is the idea that language is an instrument that allows communication or “enunciation” of thoughts by way of speech. This idea has a long history among grammarians; it is, for example, the basis of Port Royal grammar (language, according to the Port Royal grammarians, serves to “signify our thoughts [pensées],” to make known to others “the diverse movements of our soul” [pt. 2, chap. 1]. Bally develops from this idea his definition of *sentence [phrase]* (it is not clear whether by *sentence* he means an entity belonging to language [langue] or the occurrence of such an entity

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1. We find thus in Bally [LG 78–80] a parallel—actually a rather sketchy one—between the actualization of the noun by the article and that of the verb by its tense, a parallel that will be systematically developed by A. Culioli.
I would like first of all to take advantage of this occasion to express, however inadequately, my gratitude to Charles Bally. It was Bally's work, particularly the beginning of Linguistique générale et linguistiquefrancaise [pt. 1, sect. 1] that led me to develop the linguistic theory of polyphony, which I have been working on for several years. To be sure, Bally, in certain respects, did not travel far enough along the path he opened up, but he did indicate a direction. What I have just said should suggest in what way the title of my paper is more ambitious than its content. I do not intend to discuss all of Bally's contributions to pragmatics, which include the theory of expressiveness, for example, which he developed in Le langage et la vie, or the several very important topics presented at the beginning of Linguistique générale having to do with the theory of enunciation. His theory of actualization (as opposed to characterization) in Linguistique générale, which reappears in several recent works on determiners,1 as well as a definition I have often used of the notions of subordination and coordination developed from the concepts of theme and topic [see "Les indefinis et l'enonciation"] are both also worthy of note. I will not deal with any of these matters, however, but will focus on the "theory of the sentence," from which my own polyphonic theory of meaning is directly derived. I will perhaps end up speaking less about Bally than about the musings for which his work has been my point of departure; but even that, I believe, is a way of paying him homage.

1 My first point has to do with the notions of modus and dictum, which are at the very center of the theory of enunciation in Linguistique générale. Bally's starting point is the idea that language is an instrument that allows communication or "enunciation" of thoughts by way of speech. This idea has a long history among grammarians; it is, for example, the basis of Port Royal grammar (language, according to the Port Royal grammarians, serves to "signify our thoughts [pensees]," to make known to others "the diverse movements of our soul" [pt. 2, chap. 1]. Bally develops from this idea his definition of sentence [phrase] (it is not clear whether by sentence he means an entity belonging to language [langue] or the occurrence of such an entity

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in a particular speech event [parole]): “The sentence is the simplest possible form of the communication of a thought” [LG 35].

I would like to make two remarks in connection to this. First, let us note a difference—for me an essential one, as we shall see—between Bally’s formulation and Port Royal’s. Bally speaks of the “communication of a thought [une pensée],” whereas Port Royal says, “signify(ing) our thoughts,” “the movements of our soul.” In other words, even in this preliminary definition, Bally envisions the possibility that the communicated thought may not be that of the speaking subject, or even presented as that of the speaking subject. This is a point to which I shall call particular attention later on.

The second remark is the following: I have suggested that, by resorting to the notion of thought, Bally takes his place in a lengthy tradition. However, this does not mean that the definition Bally uses is uncontested or all-purpose. In fact, it is opposed to an equally possible, and frequently advocated, conception according to which language and individual sentences communicate ideas, representations, images of reality. We shall soon see that this choice of thought over idea has powerful implications for semantic description.

After characterizing the meaning of the term sentence by means of the concept of thought, Bally specifies exactly what these communicated thoughts consist of, and it immediately becomes apparent that they differ fundamentally from what we commonly call ideas. This difference has repercussions for the semantic description of sentences, since the meaning of a sentence is, for Bally, what the sentence communicates. To characterize thought, Bally, faithful once again to a well-established tradition, says that all thought consists of “reacting to a representation” [LG 35]. Following a tripartite distribution characteristic of the psychology of the day, the reaction may be intellectual (one assents to a representation or rejects it), affective (one rejoices over it or is saddened by it), or volitional (one desires the reality of the representation or fears it). From this I shall retain the notion that all thought breaks down into an active, or subjective, element—the reaction—and a passive, or objective, element—the representation.2 This is an entirely traditional analysis, as I have said; it can be found in Descartes, whom Bally refers to indirectly [LG 37nl]. Consider the following passage, from part 1 of Principe de la philosophie: “All ways of thinking that we experience in ourselves can be related to two general ways of thinking, one of which consists in perceiving through understanding and the other in defining oneself through will” [§ 32]. These two “ways” are frequently associated with each other, as in the case of judgment [§ 34]. The same analysis dictates Port Royal’s organization of grammar, in which words are separated into two classes: those signifying “the form or mode of our thoughts,” that is, “the action of our mind,” and those signifying “the objects of (our) thoughts” [pt. 2, chap. 1].

I would like to point out that an analysis analogous in many respects to this one can be found in the work of most modern “philosophers of language” (I am thinking particularly of speech act theory as formulated by Searle). They state that the meaning of an utterance is always the application of a certain illocutionary force (order, assertion, interrogation, and so forth) to a certain proposition, or “content.” The study of illocutionary force falls within the province of pragmatics, whereas the study of propositions is the domain of a logic-based semantics. The common ground between this modern theory and the traditional representation of thought is still the dissociation

2. One can find an analogous idea in the work of the logician G. H. Luquet, quoted by M. Lips, one of Bally’s students, in his work on free indirect discourse: “Any proposition [i.e., in Bally’s terms, a “thought,” O.D.] is composed of two elements. One, which we shall call “enunciation” [in Bally’s terms, “representation,” O.D.], is a product of a thought of an intellectual nature, envisioned simply by the mind; the other is an attitude, a “position taken” [in Bally’s terms, “reaction,” O.D.], of an emotional nature regarding this representation” [Logique formelle (Paris: Alcan, 1925)].
between a subjective element (Bally’s “reaction,” the pragmatic “illocutionary force”) and an objective element, which Bally calls “representation” and Searle, “proposition.”

The differences between the conceptions of Descartes, Port Royal, and Bally on the one hand and speech act theory on the other stem essentially from two points. First of all, Cartesian conceptions are avowedly based on an analysis of “thought,” while Searle, for example, claims that his theory is based on an analysis of the process of communication. According to Port Royal, it is by reflecting on the nature of a simple thought that we can discern a “manner” and an “object.” According to Searle, on the other hand, it is by reflecting on the nature of a simple act of communication that we can distinguish between an illocutionary force and a proposition. The end result, however, remains very similar, even if the point of departure is different. The things analyzed may not be exactly the same, but the analysis derives from the same structure, which seems to show that this structure is a kind of constant of our civilization as far as our representations of ourselves are concerned.

The second difference is a more important one, from my point of view. For speech act theory, the illocutionary force linked to a sentence characterizes the enunciation of that sentence: to say that “Come here!” has the illocutionary force of an order is to say that its enunciation has a specific character. On the other hand, to say that the thought a sentence signifies is a reaction to a representation in no way implies that this signified reaction is the same as the one that governs the enunciation, or that it is presented as such. If I say to you, “I like olives,” the meaning of my sentence, Bally would say, consists in a certain favorable gastronomic attitude toward a plate of olives, but as speaker I am not claiming that my enunciation amounts to having this reaction; I do not claim to utter “I like olives” because of a love for olives—whereas I do claim to utter “Come here!” because I wish to give the order to come. This varying relation that illocutionary force and “reaction” have to the enunciation is important in identifying the subject to whom they are attributed. The subject of the illocutionary act can only be the speaking subject, the author of the enunciation. By contrast, nothing in Bally’s conception requires that the subject of the communicated reaction and the speaking subject be the same. In fact, we shall see in what follows that the possibility of a dissociation between the two subjects is essential for Bally. This remark permits me to point out in advance the paradoxical character of the polyphonic conception that I am attempting to develop. I would maintain, along with speech act theory, that meaning involves enunciation, that its theme [thème] is the enunciation of the very utterance that communicates it. But I would like to acknowledge at the same time, as did Bally, that meaning can demonstrate or indicate subjects other than the speaking subject.

Once we have established that, for Bally, the meaning of a sentence is a thought, and that a thought is a reaction to a representation, we can easily define the notions of modus and dictum, which Bally took from medieval philosophy. Since the meaning of a sentence, whatever it may be, is always in the form “X has this particular reaction to this particular representation,” the first element of this binary semantic structure (X has this particular reaction) is the modus; X, the being who is reacting, is called the “modal subject” and the type of reaction is called the “modal verb.” As for the dictum, it is the representation that is the object of the reaction.

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3. This point of departure, moreover, is perhaps less different than the terminology used might suggest—if we concede that the act of thinking and the act of communicating presuppose each other.

4. In my formulation of Bally’s theory, the expressions “modal subject” and “modal verb” thus designate semantic elements, constituents of meaning, and not words—that is to say, constituents of the sentence. Bally is sometimes ambiguous on this point. He would maintain, for example, that in “I think that Pierre will come,” the words “I” and “think” are the modal subject and verb. This is, however, an obvious abuse of language. Otherwise it would be impossible to speak of the modal subject and verb in sentences with implicit structures such as “Pierre will come,” where it can no longer be a question of signifiers.
The second part of my paper will serve to demonstrate the linguistic application of the theory of meaning that I have just sketched. If the semantic structure of a sentence is always of the type “Modus (= modal subject + modal verb) + dictum,” the signifying configuration can more or less explicitly achieve this structure. Bally gives numerous examples of the various degrees of explicitness that the signified structure can receive in the signifier. I will point out only some of them, in particular those that bring out certain consequences of the theory that I find important.

A sentence is said to be “explicit” if one can divide it according to its semantic structure, that is to say, distinguish in it two segments representing the modus and the dictum, respectively, and, within the modal segment, distinguish a constituent representing the modal subject and another representing the modal verb. Consider the following examples:

I believe that the accused is innocent.
I want you to leave.
Astronomers think that the earth rotates.
My husband has decided that I am cheating on him.

The last two examples clearly show that the modal subject—that is, the subject to whom the communicated thought is attributed (the one, therefore, who reacts to the representation)—is not necessarily identical to the speaking subject. They also show that the modus is not the modality in the sense used by grammarians or logicians, namely, the position taken by the *speaker* with respect to the expressed content. Port Royal would never say in connection with the fourth example that the segment “my husband has decided” manifests the “manner of the thought.” The examples show, finally, how impossible it is to equate the expressed reaction with the one manifested by the actual enunciation. (The enunciation completed by the wife obviously does not manifest the reaction communicated by the sentence, namely the husband’s reaction when faced with the idea that he is being cheated on. What would manifest the latter would be the enunciation “She’s cheating on me,” possibly made by the husband at some other time.) Hence there is a difference, which I pointed out above, between this conception and the notion of illocutionary force proposed by the philosophers of language.

Bally himself is perfectly aware of this possible separation between speaking subject and modal subject, and of its paradoxical character: “The modal subject can be, and most often is, the speaking subject as well: this is the case with the examples given so far. But it can encompass other subjects: *We* don’t think that it will rain,* or indeed it can be another or several other subjects: ‘*Galileo* and *astronomers* think that the earth rotates’; or it can remain vague: ‘They think that the king is dead’” [LG 37].

One might suppose (although erroneously, as I shall show) that if Bally claims that this divergence exists in the case of the above examples, it is simply because his analysis confines itself to the surface structure and that, in this surface structure, it is not possible to locate for the sentences in question a segment corresponding to one a logician would normally use as his or her modus (that is, an indication of the attitude of the *speaking subject*). The problem would seem to arise, then, from simple timidity on Bally’s part, due to a lack of the speleological audacity needed to explore deep structures. The problem, in other words, would be that Bally is still too Saussurean and not Chomskyan enough.

It is obvious, however, that such an interpretation is untenable, since Bally devotes a paragraph to “implicit” sentences, defined as those wherein the modality cannot be
located in a specific segment of the speech chain. Sometimes the modal subject is not represented in the sentence. This is the case in such utterances as “It is necessary for you to stop smoking,” where the modal verb, expressed by the impersonal “it is necessary,” indicates that the dictum is the object of a decision, but where it is not specified just which modal subject the decision should be attributed to. Depending on the discourse situation, it could be the speaker or some authority figure echoed by the speaker. Sometimes the entire ensemble [modal subject + modal verb] is not represented—“It is raining” thus equals “I note that it is raining”—and in such cases Bally carefully enumerates the different traces that the modal subject and verb may have left behind (for example, the modal verb of assertive attitude is often represented on the surface simply by the grammatical form of the indicative mood).

Having at his disposal an abundance of speleological material, Bally could then easily have treated any utterance in such a way as to expose, beneath the surface, a modus conforming to traditional description, that is to say, a modus whose subject is identical to the speaking subject. For example, given the sentence “My husband has decided that I am cheating on him,” nothing would stop us from attributing to it an implicit assertive modus such as “I find that” (a modus whose surface residue would be the indicative “has decided”), taking as dictum the ensemble “My husband . . . cheating on him.” In this case we would rediscover the usual conception that conflates modal subject and speaking subject. If Bally chose not to resort to that strategy, it is because he decided from the outset to recognize the possibility of a divergence between the two subjects.

For Bally, such a decision is, moreover, connected to a much more general decision concerning the nature of language. This is what emerges, it seems to me, from a rather obscure passage situated directly after the list of the different cases of dissociation between modal subject and speaker cited above: “But even when the thinking subject is identical to the speaking subject, one must take care not to confuse personal thought and communicated thought. This distinction is of the utmost importance and can be explained by the nature and function of the linguistic sign itself” [LG 37]. In order to understand this passage, we must first interpret the conjunctions that introduce it: “but even [mais même].” The general structure that they fit into seems to me to be of the type: “p, but even when not-p, q.” A simple example of this would be, “Sometimes it is nice outside, but even when it is raining, Pierre goes for a walk.” In Bally’s text, the paragraph that precedes “but even when” gives us p, that is to say, the list of the different possible cases of dissociation between modal subject and speaking subject. q, then, consists in the distinction between real thought and communicated thought, a distinction made even when not-p—that is to say, even when the thinking subject (the modal subject to whom the communicated thought is attributed) and the speaking subject are not dissociated.

The structure “sometimes p, but even when not-p, q” still implies (perhaps presupposes) that when p is proven to be true, so too is q (in my example: “when it’s nice, Pierre goes for a walk”). The object of the communication itself (according to the speaker) is to indicate that q is also proven true when p is not satisfied. Furthermore, the two indications are presented as possible arguments for a certain conclusion, the second being even more significant to this end than the first.5 Bally’s text, therefore, makes three points:

1. the cases of dissociation between modal subject and speaking subject bring to light a distinction between the real thought of the speaking subject and the thought that is communicated;

5. That the two elements articulated by “even” are given as arguments for the same conclusion r, does not, according to the theory of argumentation in language, necessarily imply that the speaker is using them for an act of argumentation in favor of r. It is necessary to distinguish between the argumentative aims conveyed by the utterance (and attributed to the enunciators put into play in that utterance) and the act of argumentation accomplished by the speaker who identifies him- or herself with one of these enunciators.
2. this distinction, far from being limited to such cases, also holds true when modal subject and speaking subject are identical;

3. both of these points—(2) more than (1)—support the same conclusion.

In order to interpret Bally’s text, we now have to spell out this conclusion. I will claim that it is constituted by the general semiological principle: “All communication implies a distinction between the communicated thought and the personal thought of the one who is speaking.” According to Bally, this principle is obviously satisfied when the speaking subject and the modal subject are dissociated, but it is also satisfied when they coincide. In the latter instance, in fact, it is still possible (I am summarizing what follows the passage I cited above) for speakers to attribute to themselves, in the act of communication, thoughts that are not their own. (This is what occurs in the case of lies or irony: in Bally’s terms, we are then faced with a “split personality,” the speaking subject being the focus of two different thoughts at the same time—the speaker’s thought and the thought communicated as being the speaker’s thought.)

Bally takes this generalization even further. The perpetual possibility of a separation between the thought one has and the thought one attributes to oneself seems to him to be a necessary consequence of the nature of the sign. Insofar as the sign, according to the Saussurean formula, is composed of both a signifier and a signified, and insofar as the signified for Bally is a thought, our freedom to choose signs, then, implies freedom to choose a thought: the treasure trove of sentences put at our disposal by language is at the same time an array of masks or a wardrobe of costumes that allow us to play a multitude of different roles—and even if the chosen role conforms to some “real” thought, it is still a role. Contrary to Port Royal’s formula, one does not communicate “one’s” thought, one communicates “a” thought (which can be chosen either because it corresponds to what one is actually thinking or because it does not). On this point the difference between Bally and Lacanian psychoanalysts is that Bally, relying on a psychology still sure of its object, never doubts the existence of a “real thought” that can either resemble the communicated thought or not. However, Bally never confuses this communicated thought—the only one that he is concerned with as a linguist—with the one that he believes to be the real thought, even if the two do coincide.

This allows me to return to the problem that directly interests me here, that of understanding the dissociation between modal subject and speaking subject as it appears in the text I was just discussing. On the one hand, Bally takes it for granted that there is a relation between this dissociation and the need to distinguish between communicated thought and real thought (this is the first point that I drew from “but even when”). On the other hand, he makes an argument based on this relation (a weak argument—since it needs to be completed by a stronger one, furnished by the second point—but a real one nonetheless) in favor of the general semiological principle of the distinction between real thought and communicated thought (the third point conveyed by “but even when”). What strikes me as important in this undertaking is that the dissociation of the two subjects (the one who speaks and the one to whom the thought is attributed in the act of communication) is not viewed as a marginal and accidental phenomenon, even though Bally finds it to be

6. The conclusion r of the continuation of “sometimes p and, even when not-p, q” thus resembles the proposition q here, but it has nothing to do with the logical necessity of holding q as true if it is also true in the two complementary cases p and not-p (generally speaking, what I mean by argumentation does not have much to do with logical necessity).

7. The distinction between personal thought and communicated thought and its illustration through the possibility of lying (which is thus no longer considered as a marginal and pathological phenomenon) are found frequently in the history of linguistics. For example, J. B. Vico sees in this distinction the essential character of intellectual language in relation to the emotive language of primitive humanity: for Vico, the possibility of lying is the inevitable consequence of abandoning emotive language.
relatively rare, occurring only “occasionally.” On the contrary, it is bound to the very nature of the sign. This implies that one does not directly communicate one’s own thought, but only a thought—which may or may not coincide with one’s own. Thus, the distinction between speaking subject and modal subject would only be the most obvious aspect of the schizophrenic character inherent in all communication.

The following list brings together the three cases Bally isolates concerning the relations between personal thought and real thought:

1. The communicated thought is attributed to the speaking subject. (Thus, speaking subject = modal subject.) This thought actually corresponds to that of the speaking subject (speaking honestly and seriously).

2. The communicated thought is not attributed to the speaking subject. (Thus, speaking subject ≠ modal subject.)

Moreover, I will distinguish a fourth case, by subdividing (2) just as (1) is. In (2a), as in (2b), the speaking subject would be different from the modal subject, but in (2a) the communicated thought would be the same as the thought of the person to whom it is attributed; by contrast, in (2b) the communicated thought would not coincide with the thought of the person to whom it is attributed. This last category, would contain, most notably, cases of recourse to “fictitious authorities,” wherein you speak “through” someone else who has never in fact said what you have in mind but do not dare to say on your own behalf.

Before studying an important development in Linguistique générale of the distinction between modal subject and speaking subject (this will be the focus of the next section), I would like to present and discuss two examples given by Bally of sentences with implicit structures. I have chosen the first because Bally’s analysis can be related to certain propositions that have recently been put forth in the philosophy of language, the second because it has implications for the problems I will be discussing in the following section.

Bally discusses cases in which the “modality is incorporated in the dictum in the form of an adjective of judgment or evaluation” [46]. He uses the utterance “This fruit is delicious” as an example and analyzes it by attributing to it the semantic structure “I enjoy eating it,” wherein one finds a modal subject (“I”), a modal verb (“enjoy”), and a dictum (“I eat this fruit”).

I would first like to eliminate a certain terminological vagueness which does not ultimately render the analysis any less interesting. If the adjective delicious, which is a signifier, is part of the dictum (as Bally says it is), then it would be necessary to assume that the notion of “dictum” designates an entity belonging to the order of the signifier—an entity that, in this case, would be the utterance itself taken as a whole. But then we would no longer be able to define this notion: it cannot be a question of the “representation” to which the modal subject is reacting, since that would by definition be part of the signified; nor can it be said that the dictum is the expression of this representation, since, in the example delicious fruit, the adjective, given as an element of the dictum, does not express a representation but a “reaction.” The best solution to this terminological headache, I believe, is to maintain the convention that I posited at the beginning of this article and that corresponds, for the most part, to Linguistique générale’s usage: The dictum will be considered to be an element of the semantic structure, thus a part of the signified—it consists in a representation of reality. And in order to formulate Bally’s analysis of the utterance “This fruit is delicious,” we will say that, in this case and contrary to what happens when the modal verb and subject are given explicitly, the grammatical...
predicate, an element of the signifier, combines two signifieds—one of which comes under the modus (“I enjoy”) and the other under the dictum (“eating”).

Whatever we may make of these terminological difficulties, I find Bally’s analysis to be, as I have said, extremely modern; it is at any rate easily situated within the debate in the field of philosophy of language that opposes ascriptivism and descriptivism. The descriptivists see in every declarative utterance a description or representation of reality, stating that given objects have given properties or are in given relationships. The ascriptivists, following Austin, assume, on the contrary, that in many utterances the declarative aspect is a mask disguising a fundamental function that is very different from a simple statement. Thus, according to the descriptivists, the sentence “This hotel is good” serves firstly to attribute to the object-hotel the property of being good-for-a-hotel. The ascriptivist analysis of the same sentence, on the other hand, probes behind this descriptive cover, which renders it similar to “This table is red,” and brings to light a speech act of recommendation unrelated to assertions: the performative paraphrase of the sentence would be, “I recommend this hotel to you.”

It is immediately apparent that Bally’s analysis of the adjective delicious heralds Austin’s. There is really only one difference: according to Bally, the nonrepresentational part of the meaning of the utterance consists in a mental attitude, whereas for Austinians it is a question of illocutionary force. Furthermore, the problems raised by the two theories are analogous. How does one describe evaluative adjectives when they are part of grammatically complex sentences such as, “When you feel sick, no fruit seems delicious” or “When you are sick, the most delicious fruit seems tasteless [insipide]”? In both cases, the adjective delicious appears to function as a label designating a property inherent to certain fruits. In any event, it refers directly neither to the illocutionary act that would be carried out nor to the reaction that would be expressed by the very enunciation of the utterance.

I see two ways in which one can accommodate this type of example while still maintaining that delicious—like other evaluatives—marks a “subjective” position,8 but both are alien to Bally’s explicit theory. The first way is to resort to the notion of “dislocutive derivation,” by stating that the adjective delicious, initially destined to signify a reaction or an act, has come to suggest and to designate a pseudoproperty of things, a property that is supposed to lead to the accomplishment of the action or to the expression of that reaction—a property that has no other reality than that of being their explanation or their justification.9 The second way is to describe the complex utterances that were my examples as types of crystallized dialogues (a treatment that lies within the framework of the theory of polyphony).

Thus, taking my last example, one would say that the speaker—I mean by speaker the person to whom the responsibility for the enunciation is attributed—puts forth two enunciators who react (in the sense that Bally uses the term) in opposite ways to the same object (a piece of fruit). The one who is ill would have the reaction expressed by the adjective tasteless, while the one who is not would have the reaction expressed by the adjective delicious. Thus, one would actually deduce the general meaning of the utterance from the very fact that it is a staged dialogue, staged according to a particular protocol that is inscribed in the organization of the sentence (just as the meaning of a play is derived from the fact that it has caused the various characters to act and speak in a certain fashion).

8. The expression “to mark a subjective position” implies, in my opinion, that the meaning of the adjective includes an allusion to this position. It is not just a question (I hope this goes without saying) of the cliché according to which what is delicious for X can be repugnant for Y.

It is immediately evident that, in order to consider a polyphonic solution of this kind, one must allow for the possible coexistence of several modi and dicta within the meaning of any one utterance. This is a possibility that is not explicitly developed in any of Bally’s analyses and that, moreover, would call for an even more radical dissociation between syntactic and semantic structures than that implied by *Linguistique générale*.

The second example I will discuss is the sentence “This lecture is monotonous. [Ce sermon est monotone]” [LG 46]. Bally proposes to analyze this as “This lecture is flat, I am bored by this lecture [Ce sermon est uniforme, je m’ennuie à ce sermon].” Unfortunately, he does not specify how one can fit this analysis into the canonical schema “modus–dictum.” I personally see no other possible solution than to recognize the existence of two modi, “I am bored” and “I find,” applied respectively to the dicta “I listen to this lecture” and “This lecture is flat.” This theoretical possibility was contemplated during the same period, moreover, by other linguists. Thus Brunot recognizes two modalities in “That old man, perhaps a respectable fellow, deserved it” [La pensée et la langue 508]: one is affirmative and concerns what the old man deserves; the other is dubitative and concerns his respectability. But this plurality of modalities would have important consequences for Bally that it cannot have for Brunot.

Brunot, who is faithful to the grammatical tradition, must view a modality as by definition representing the attitude of the speaking subject, a situation that would be expressed in *Linguistique générale*’s terminology by saying that speaking subject and modal subject are always identical. Thus the different modalities recognized by Brunot necessarily have a single source. But Bally, who distinguishes between these two subjects and thus refuses to anchor modality in any individual belonging to the real world, would not be prevented from assuming separate modal subjects for a single utterance: the utterance can then represent different people’s reactions or points of view. This suggests a theatrical conception of enunciation: the meaning of the utterance describes enunciation as the confrontation of different points of view which are juxtaposed to, superimposed on, or involved in dialogue with each other.

None of the examples given by Bally imposes this conception, of course: if the utterance about the lecture suggests a plurality of modi, in each of the two modi the modal subject is still identifiable with the speaking subject in such a way that one can accept, in the last analysis, the existence of a single modal subject. However, it is easy to imagine utterances (in fact, they are often encountered) in which an analysis along Bally’s lines would force us to recognize not only diverse modi but also diverse modal subjects. Otherwise, how do we account for this verse from La Fontaine’s *Animals Afflicted with the Plague*, for example: “His peccadillo was judged a capital offense (a case for hanging) [Sa peccadille fut jugé un cas pendable].” For Bally—who considers every reported discourse as the expression of a modus—it must be assumed that the verse presents a reaction on the part of the animals, who are judging the donkey’s mistake as a reason for hanging: we have, then, a modal subject the animals, a modal verb to condemn to death, and a dictal representation the donkey grazed in the meadow. Yet it is clear that the use of the word peccadillo implies that a second modus is applicable to this representation, this new modus expressing the narrator’s point of view: the narrator is its subject and the modal verb would be something like “to excuse” or “to exonerate.”

I conclude from these various analyses that a reading of Bally points toward—a theatrical conception of meaning in which the utterance is construed as the staging of different attitudes—attitudes that either are

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10. The type of demonstration that leads one to look, in syntactic structure, only for marks (and no longer for the framework) of “semantic structure,” is proposed, for example, in the study “D’ailleurs” published in Ducrot et al., *Les mots du discours* [Paris: Seuil, 1980] (“notation XYpq”).
independent of each other or are in a relation of dialogue with one another. I am asserting that Bally’s text “leads” to this conclusion because nothing in his theory runs counter to this conception and, moreover, because this conception becomes inevitable as soon as one applies the types of analyses set forth in *Linguistique générale* to more complex examples than those considered in that work.

It now remains for me to explore a problem directly related to the distinction of modal subject and speaking subject, a problem Bally addresses in the final paragraph of the chapter I am examining, under the title “Processes of Communication” [*LG* 50–52]. Thus far only two elements, modus and dictum, have appeared in the semantic structure of the sentence. Bally now adds a third element, which he calls “communication.” Consider the following passage, which offers what I will call the canonical form of signification according to *Linguistique générale*: “The sentence *The earth rotates* logically signifies ‘I make it known to you (communication) that I am convinced (modality) that the earth rotates’” [50] (and not merely “I am convinced that the earth rotates,” as Bally had implied up to this point). We must then add a third role to those of speaking subject and modal subject—that of communicating subject, designated in the preceding example by the “I” of “I make it known to you *(je vous fais savoir)*.” The fact that the function of communicating subject is different from that of modal subject (even though, as I will show shortly, the individuals performing the two functions are, for Bally, always the same) becomes apparent through a simple examination of the canonical form, which distinguishes the subject of *to make it known* and that of *to be convinced*. The fact that the function of communicating subject must be distinguished from that of speaking subject is less evident, since the speaking subject, who is by definition external to the meaning, does not appear in the canonical form of the meaning. Nevertheless, this difference of function does emerge in Bally’s text; Bally cites several examples in which the speaking subject and the communicating subject cannot be the same person, the duality of the individuals implying *a fortiori* that the functions are distinct.

In this connection a particularly clear instance can be found in Bally’s commentary on the utterance attributed to a servant who announces to her mistress, “A gentleman wishes to speak with Madame.” According to Bally, if there is any indication relating to communication it is implicit in this utterance. This indication would stem from the fact that the servant “reproduces the visitor’s own words: ‘I wish to speak to Madame.’” Bally’s commentary is rather surprising since the servant obviously does not reproduce the words of the visitor as such; the visitor did not say “a gentleman,” and he may very well have mentioned the name of the lady (“I wish to speak to Madame Dupont”) without the servant being obliged to repeat the name. It seems to me that what Bally means is that the gentleman is the communicating subject: he is the person who, at the heart of the meaning of the utterance, is trying to “make something known”—whereas the speaking subject can only be the servant, the spokesperson. In other words, Bally’s analysis of the utterance, if it had been presented explicitly, would have been: “A gentleman makes it known (communication) that he wishes (modality) to speak to Madame.”

This way of distinguishing the three subjects (one of which, the speaking subject, does not belong to signification proper) in this fashion seems to me to be very close to the analysis of the narrative act proposed by Genette in *Figures III*. Genette’s *writer* [*l’écrivain*], that is, the historical individual (Proust, Balzac, and so on) who invents the story or at least gives it a literary form, does not belong to the narrative of which he/she is the source, just as Bally’s speaking subject is not involved in the meaning of the utterance. Genette’s *narrator* [*narrateur*], the one who, according to the text itself, is
assumed to be recounting the events, could in turn be viewed as being analogous with the communicating subject, that is to say, the one who, according to the utterance’s signification, “makes something known.” And, finally, the analogy is almost obvious between the modal or thinking subject on the one hand and, on the other, Genette’s center of perspective or focalization, the one who “sees,” whose point of view is chosen to present the events. Bally’s canonical formula thus finds its counterpart in a narrative schema, such as: “The narrator says (voice) that X sees (modality) such and such a thing happen.”

This is, moreover, the same tripartition that I developed in my polyphonic theory of enunciation, presented in Le dire et le dit. In that work I maintain that the speaking subject, the actual producer of the utterance, has no predetermined place in the semantic structure of the utterance,11 that is, in the description that she/he gives of the enunciation. However, I do introduce into this structure the roles of speaker and enunciator. The function of the speaker (a function that, in certain utterances, may not be fulfilled) consists in being presented as the source of the enunciation, and the function of the enunciator consists in being presented as the person responsible for the points of view expressed by the enunciation. These functions, it is clear, correspond fairly well to Bally’s communicating subject and modal subject, respectively. The essential difference, which I will come back to, brings to light the paradoxical (but not, in my view, contradictory) aspect of my polyphonic theory. For me, speaker and enunciator, although they are distinct (as in Linguistique générale) from the actual speaking subject, serve to characterize the very enunciation in which they appear. Not only do I assume, like Bally, that their reality is intralinguistic, that they are elements of meaning, but I believe as well that they could not be derived from the image of the world conveyed by the utterance: I consider them, as I have said, to be a characterization, by the utterance, of its own enunciation. In fact, even when an enunciator is assimilated to someone other than the speaking subject, I would not say, as Bally seems to be doing, that the meaning consists in indicating that a given person in the world sees things in a given way: the meaning of the utterance is that its enunciation expresses this way of seeing things (to use a classic distinction in the philosophy of language, I would say that the enunciator’s point of view is not asserted but shown).

Before pointing out a few of the problems raised by Bally’s theory when the element of “communication” is introduced into it, I would first like to summarize his analysis of that element, confining myself to those aspects that will aid our discussion. If the structure modus-dictum is not always already made explicit in the syntactic organization of the sentence, the same therefore holds a fortiori for the complete structure. This leads to the determination of different degrees in this clarification, ranging from absolute latency (The earth rotates) to complete explicitness (I myself am telling you that I know that the earth rotates) [LG 51]. I will deal with two of these degrees, which are important both in themselves and for the discussion that follows.

What would now be called “a marker of illocutionary act,” whether it involves performative verbs or purely pragmatic morphemes, Bally describes as the amalgam of a verb of communication and a modal verb: “To affirm signifies ‘to say that one believes,’ to say that + subjunctive signifies ‘to say that one wishes that.’” It is much the same for the interrogative marker Est-ce que (“is it the case that”); it means the same thing as “I’m asking you if,” and, like its performative paraphrase, it brings together two ideas, “the desire to learn something from someone and the communication of that desire” [LG 51].

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11. Thus I do not accept the formulation according to which I refers to the speaking subject. This of course does not rule out the possibility that the roles of speaker and enunciator—roles that are inscribed in the semantic structure—may be attributed to a person who happens to be the speaking subject (this attribution of a role holder to a role is what I call the “assimilation” of the speaker or enunciator to a certain individual).
(This analysis of performative utterances has at least one point in common with the analysis provided by the “philosophy of language” much later. In both cases emphasis is on the idea that these utterances exhibit the act of communication of which they are the result. But for Bally this exhibition does not have any particular function and serves no purpose. For the philosophy of language, on the contrary, the revelation of the communication determines the illocutionary force—real or claimed—of the utterance: in questioning someone, one is presenting the act of communication as effective, in the sense that it is supposed to oblige the other person to respond.)

Another important degree of implicitation is found when the surface structure marks either only the communication or only the modality: thus we say either “Galileo says that the earth rotates” or “Galileo believes that the earth rotates.” In the first case, it is the modality that is implied, and in the second case, it is the communication, so that the complete meaning for both utterances would be, “Galileo says that he believes that the earth rotates.” The fact that the interpreting subjects reveal the first implication postulated by Bally can perhaps be understood if we suppose that they implement a principle such as “you could not say that p without saying that you believe that p.” (We can see, however, that although this principle can be formulated in an apparently reasonable fashion, if it is to produce the result Bally wants, it must be understood in the following manner, though this formulation by the same token makes the principle highly debatable: “in saying p, one is only saying that one believes that p, and nothing more.” The second implication, the one that goes from “to believe that p” to “to say that p,” is even less understandable, for there are other reasons to attribute a belief to Galileo—and his judges knew it well—than to find it expressed in his words or writings. Consider: “He never admitted that to me, but I am sure that he thinks it.”

Leaving aside the particular problems raised by the examples in Linguistique générale, I would like to point out, with respect to the “communication” element, two general difficulties on which Bally does not take a clear enough position, in my opinion. The first difficulty involves the status to be given to this element. Bally proposes two different ways of characterizing this status without choosing between them; but from my point of view they are incompatible.

One of these characterizations is functional in nature; the “communication” element is the trace, in a sentence, of the fundamental function of any sentence: “Since language serves to communicate thought, it can be expected to mark this fundamental characteristic by appropriate devices” [LG 50]. This is a somewhat surprising explanation, as it could also be expected, if the function of any utterance whatsoever is to make something known, that that function, on the contrary, need not be marked: only what is not self-evident needs to be marked. It might be argued that while the accomplishment of an act of communication is self-evident, the same is not true for the identity of the communicating subject—which therefore warrants being marked. I cannot deny that possibility, since I have indicated the relation between Bally’s communicating subject and my own “speaker,” which, like Genette’s “narrator,” often has its marks in the materiality of the text. However, this possibility cannot be expressed in terms of function, as it is in Linguistique générale. If we look closer at the passage I have just quoted, we may indeed wonder what the complement of the verb to serve is in this text. Whom does language serve in carrying out an act of communication? It seems to me that it can only serve the one who is using it, in other words, the speaking subject. Now, as I said, it is clear that, according to Bally, the speaking and communicating subjects can be distinct entities. When the servant announces, “A gentleman wishes to speak to Madame,” the sentence serves the servant, the speaking subject, and not the gentleman, the communicating subject. I conclude from this that the presence, in the structure of the sentence, of a subject and verb of communication (I am again using Bally’s terms) is in no way the mark of the communicative function of that sentence, since this function relates to the actual producer of the
sentence. In order to describe what happens in enunciation, it is therefore necessary to say: “A speaking subject X indicates that a communicating subject Y makes it known that a modal subject Z believes that p” (for example: “the servant indicates that a gentleman makes it known that he wishes to speak to Madame”). The function of the utterance is to indicate something, and it is the speaking subject X who confers this function upon it; but neither X nor the function can be marked in the utterance. On the other hand, Bally’s “communicating subject,” Y, can be marked in the sentence, but then by the same token this subject could not be characterized in functionalist terms.

In fact Linguistique générale also suggests, and on the very same page, a different way of characterizing the “communication” element: “The earth rotates logically signifies ‘I make known to you...’” Here the specification of the communication process seems to stem from the very meaning of the utterance. But it must be noted that such a formulation, more in keeping with Bally’s general theory (or at least with what I have extracted from that theory), precludes identifying the meaning of the sentence with the “thought communicated” by the sentence, as the section dedicated to the modus and dictum would lead us to believe: here, on the contrary, the phenomenon of communication seems to be integrated with the meaning. This does away with one of the principal differences that I pointed out between Bally and the philosophers of language: in both cases the meaning of an utterance appears to be a description of the very enunciation that conveys it. This highlights the paradoxical aspect of Bally’s theory—a paradox that I think is justified and that I placed at the center of my polyphonic theory: while describing its enunciation, an utterance can not only bring to light the viewpoints of modal subjects (in my terminology, enunciators) that are different from those of the speaking subject, but it can also attribute responsibility for the enunciation to someone (Bally’s communicating subject or my speaker) who is not the actual producer of the words spoken either.

The second theoretical problem I would like to raise concerns the relationships between the modal and the communicating subjects. Even though he does not say so explicitly, Bally seems in fact to take for granted that they have to coincide. What allows me to attribute this opinion to Bally is first of all the fact that, in the examples he offers, the same person plays both roles. In any event, Bally’s analysis of these examples always ends up assimilating the two, even when there is room for doubt. This is what happens with the example of the servant, where, according to Bally, the communicating subject is the gentleman, whereas we could easily imagine it being the servant (who, in this case, would be communicating the wishes of the gentleman, the modal subject).

There is another reason to suppose that Bally postulates that the communicative and modal origins are necessarily the same: this postulate would explain why Bally, as I pointed out earlier, attributes just one modal subject to each sentence. Once this identity is acknowledged, we must indeed recognize that if we accept the possibility of different modal subjects, there can also be different communicative subjects. A communicative plurality might seem absurd, considering that the sentence is defined precisely by its internal cohesion, that is to say, by the fact that its diverse constituents are not juxtaposed but rather combined in a unitary organization. This is the case whether this unitary character stems from, as Bally says, the theme-rheme [thème-propos] structure (one says something about something), whether it is represented by a single, higher-level node to which all the constituents are attached, as in the tree grammars of Tesnières or Chomsky, or whether it is tied to the existence of a central predicate enriched by a plurality of complements, as in Martinet’s functionalism. This cohesiveness, which constitutes the sentence, precludes distributing responsibility for the sentence among various communicative sources. If, then, we attribute to Bally the postulate that I borrowed from him, according to which the modal subject and the communicating subject must necessarily coincide, we see that he categorically refuses to recognize a plurality of modal subjects without justifying his refusal by any empirical arguments.
In order to reinforce this point, I would like to add that this exegesis of *Linguistique générale* is implied by the passage in which Bally ponders the function that communication-marking devices have in the economy of a language. Bally notes first of all that the explicitation of such a device is unnecessary when the speaking subject is supposed to be expressing his or her own thought, that is to say, when the speaking and modal subjects coincide. Indeed, in this case the very fact of speech, the “general deictic,” “identifies the expression with the speaker’s thought” (a formulation I interpret as “identifies the expressed thought with the speaker’s thought, that is, ultimately identifies the modal subject with the speaking subject”). Any indication of the author of the communication, then, has only a stylistic value of emphasis. While there may be some reason other than a stylistic one to make this indication explicit, this only happens, according to Bally, in those cases where the modal subject and the actual speaking subject are different, and it serves to indicate this divergence, as in “Pierre says: I am sick” or “Pierre says that he is sick”; Bally maintains (and I do not agree with him on this point) that both of these sentences have Pierre as modal subject, since he is the person who believes that Pierre is sick. But, in order to make this concession, Bally clearly has to presume that Pierre, since the utterance makes him the communicating subject, must also appear as the modal subject. Once again, this amounts to conceding, a priori, that these two subjects are necessarily identical.

This postulate is difficult to avoid; it can be found in most investigations of enunciation, even those that refuse, as Bally does, to reduce subjectivity to the single role of the actual producer of the utterance. This can be seen, for example, though along different strategic lines than those of *Linguistique générale*, in Ann Banfield’s article “Où l’épistémologie, le style et la grammaire rencontrent l’histoire littéraire.” She pays particular attention to the speaker [locuteur] (who is analogous to the “communicating subject”; Banfield’s speaker, like Bally’s subject, is not the actual producer of speech, but the person identified in the utterance as the source of the communication). Contrary to what Bally says, Banfield contends that there need not be a speaker, and furthermore that when there is one, this speaker necessarily has the same identity as the actual speaking subject (in my terminology, the speaker is assimilated with the speaking subject). But Banfield joins Bally in affirming that, if there is a speaker, that speaker must also be the modal subject. Both of them find it absurd that an utterance could simultaneously present itself as the work of X and as expressing the point of view of Y. The following chart summarizes the positions held by (1) traditional linguistics, (2) Bally, (3) Banfield, and (4) my polyphonic theory. (“+” = necessary, “-” = optional, “S” = speaker, “SS” = actual speaking subject, “MS” = modal subject.)

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If, as the chart shows, there is a consistent tendency to attribute the two roles of speaker and modal subject to the same actor, one can cite many examples that are difficult to deal with from this perspective. This is the case, first of all, whenever there are several modal subjects. To be sure, it would not be quite fair on my part to base my argument on the line cited earlier, “His peccadillo was judged a capital offense.” In my opinion this
line cannot be analyzed as the expression of two points of view, because “was judged” seems to me to arise not from the expression but from the relationship, from a point of view. (The relationship, in my opinion, and contrary to Bally’s, does not express the reported point of view but rather integrates it with the only point of view expressed, namely, that of the reporter. The source of the reported point of view does not, then, play the role of enunciator, but rather that of an object internal to the point of view of the reporter, the sole enunciator.) On the other hand, I can use certain cases of free indirect discourse as arguments, cases in which the utterance, in its presentation of the events, has embedded in it the visions that clearly distinct individuals have of those events. This is the case when La Fontaine describes the torments of the cobbler who has become rich: “If some cat made a noise, The cat was making off with the money....” It is significant that Bally, commenting on these lines in his study of free indirect discourse, produces an analysis that is both unacceptable to and required by his monomodal theory of enunciation. According to him, it is the cobbler who is expressing himself in the main clause. Now, it is not evident why the cobbler, even if he were a millionaire, would imagine that he was being robbed by a cat. In fact, the cobbler thinks that someone (some person) is stealing the money, whereas the fabulist reduces this someone to the dimensions of an honest cat, and the line combines the two points of view in a single utterance.

I would like to add another, more direct argument to show the possible noncoincidence between communicating and modal subjects. This argument is taken from cases in which the communicating subject is clearly indicated in the utterance, and where it would nevertheless be impossible to assimilate the communicating subject to the modal subject—for example, when one finds an I in an utterance in free indirect discourse. Consider: “Pierre holds an incredible grudge against me: I’ve always hated him, I always will hate him.” The marker I shows that someone is taking responsibility for the enunciation, but it is certainly not the person (in this instance, Pierre) whose viewpoint is expressed in the utterance containing the word I. Even apart from free indirect discourse in the strict sense, we can bolster our argument against Bally by using all the utterances in which one employs an I while expressing (expressing, not reporting) someone else’s point of view: “It seems that I am going to be elected”; “According to Pierre, I am sick.” Moreover, the presence of a first-person marker is not even required in order to signify that the discourse must be attributed to some particular person. Consider, for example, a “No Smoking” sign. Bally remarks in the section on modus that the modal subject must generally be identified here with a collective entity or “person” such as the administration. And, in the section devoted to “communication,” he implies that this same entity also constitutes the communicating subject. But what if, on entering a no-smoking area with a friend who smokes, I were to whisper to him “no smoking”? The administration is still the modal subject, but I am the communicating subject, and the communicating role I am playing can be made explicit by “I’m warning you” or “Be careful!”

This argument can be combined, moreover, with the one drawn above from the plurality of modal subjects. Taking the preceding utterances, it suffices to add, say, an affective interjection presenting the speaker’s point of view. Consider: “Oh dear [hélas], it looks like I’m going to be elected,” or “Oh dear, according to Pierre, I’m sick.” The modal subject (enunciator) whose disappointment is expressed by the “oh dear” can, or even must, in these instances, be assimilated to the person (speaker [locuteur]) designated by I and not to the modal subjects (other enunciators) of the opinions presented. The plurality of subjects can be made even more striking by inserting “oh dear” into “no

12. When the modal subject of the disappointment is assimilated to the speaker, one could say that he or she “expresses” his or her disappointment, and not just that the disappointment is expressed by the enunciation of oh dear or too bad. But that is not necessary: cf. “Hélas pour toi, hélas pour lui” (Too bad for you, too bad for him).
smoking.” Let us suppose that I do not myself smoke. The disappointment of “Oh dear, no smoking” is no longer, then, that of the speaker but that of the friend to whom I am speaking: we have, then, two enunciators—the administration and the friend—neither of whom can be assimilated to the communicating subject.

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Having shown both what I owe to Bally and why I think we should take the notion of polyphony—a necessary one, as he indicates—much further than he does, I would like to point out briefly three theoretical choices that I find essential for a coherent implementation of such an undertaking.

A. In conformity with the philosophy of language and in opposition to Bally (or, rather, retaining that one passage where he says that the utterance “signifies,” among other things, the process of communication), I will posit that the meaning of an utterance consists of at least a partial description of its own enunciation. The indications concerning the communicating and modal subjects stem from this description, which thus signals the source of the utterance and the points of view expressed in it.

B. When we note in an enunciation the presence of certain words, or a certain viewpoint, we must specify whether those words or that viewpoint are reported, mentioned, in other words whether their existence is the object of an affirmation or whether they are rather expressed, and the enunciation is thus presented as their manifestation. Only what is expressed can constitute this description of the enunciation by the utterance, which I see (cf. A) as the general characteristic of meaning.

C. The viewpoints that, according to the meaning of the utterance, are expressed through the enunciation should not be analyzed by the linguist (Bally’s approach notwithstanding; on this point he is faithful to traditional grammar) as binary structures composed of a subjective element (the modus) applied to an objective element (the dictum). It is not a matter of adopting an attitude toward a content. If that were indeed the case, the attitudes would necessarily have to be those of individuals. However, it is difficult to see how these individuals would be different from the communicating subject (speaker)—unless, of course, we were dealing with mentioned attitudes: while the communicating subject can mention the attitude of someone else, he or she can express only his or her own. The ever-present possibility of a separation between the communicating subject and the “communicated thoughts” means, therefore, that these “thoughts” will appear not as “reactions” to facts but as ways of seeing the facts, where the objective and the subjective are indissociable—the subjective being only a particular organization of the objective (in the sense that Leibniz’s monad is not an attitude toward the world but a way of seeing the world, or rather the world represented in a certain way). This does not prevent these ways of seeing from conceivably being attributed to specific individuals (an attribution which I call “assimilation” of the enunciator to a given individual).

These three arguments are, as we have seen, either absent from or even contrary to the text of Linguistique générale. Nevertheless they seem useful for the fullest development of a polyphonic analysis of the subject, an analysis of which Bally is probably the principal pioneer in modern linguistics.

Translated by Catherine Porter, Kara Rabbitt, and Linda Waugh
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